La unidad de la virtud y la educación en los contrarios (Leyes I)

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Beatriz Bossi

Resumo

En este artículo planteo las siguientes preguntas: 1) por qué la valentía es rebajada al cuarto lugar en el ranking de las virtudes; 2) en qué se diferencia de la moderación, si ambas tienen como objeto los placeres, y 3) qué relación guarda esta caracterización con las concepciones de la virtud que se presentan en el Protágoras, el Fedón y la República. Intento argumentar que, aunque Platón adopta un enfoque holístico y dinámico de la virtud en su conjunto, la valentía es rebajada al último lugar no sólo porque el Ateniense quiere cuestionar el enfoque guerrero de sus interlocutores que da la prioridad exclusiva a esta virtud, sino también porque esta virtud estaría más alejada de la razón, en cuanto es propia de la parte impulsiva del alma. Por otra parte, la educación conjunta en el placer y el dolor como contrarios de un mismo continuum supone que moderación y valentía, aunque tienen como objeto principal el placer y el dolor respectivamente, resultan complementarias, deben ser adquiridas con el mismo método y se refuerzan mutuamente. Finalmente, entiendo que el último Platón conserva una perspectiva integradora de las virtudes que resulta cercana a la que ofrece en las obras mencionadas.

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Biografia do Autor

Beatriz Bossi, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)

My career began in Buenos Aires, working at CONICET as a fellow (1980-81; 82-83); then as an assistant researcher (83-91) and finally as an associate researcher (91-95). The two most relevant publications from this stage appear in The Review of Metaphysics (1986 and 1989). I completed my PhD on the relationship between virtue and knowledge in Plato and Aristotle (University of Barcelona, 2000) under the supervision of J. Sales i Coderch. An article on this topic was published in Hermathena (edited by J. Dillon) and another in the Proceedings of the International Plato Society in 2000 on Plato's Lysis. The Czech Platonic Society published three of my works in Prague. I obtained two grants from Caja Madrid: one to complete my thesis and another post-doctoral grant. Since 2003, I have been working at the Faculty of Philosophy of the UCM, first as an assistant and then as a tenured professor in 2007. I published three books, one in Spanish, as author: Saber Gozar, Estudios sobre el Placer en Platón (Trotta, 2008) and two others in English as co-editor: Plato's Sophist Revisited (De Gruyter, 2013) and Plato’s Statesman Revisited (De Gruyter, 2018), which bring together a selection of papers presented at the International Spring Seminars I organized in Benasque in 2009 and at the UCM in 2016. In 2018, I organized the III International Spring Seminar on Plato’s Theaetetus. I intend to publish a selection of the papers presented in 2019 with the same publisher, and I hope to complete the series of critical studies on the interpretation of Plato's Eleatic dialogues with Parmenides, the topic of the meeting scheduled for 2020. Since April 2015, I have been a member of the Editorial Committee of the International Plato Society. I spent a research stay under the supervision of Alexander Nehamas at Princeton University (April-June 2015) and two months at the University of California, Santa Barbara, under the supervision of Voula Tsouna (February-March 2018). Author of more than 60 articles on the Presocratics, Plato, and Aristotle, I am a member of several national and inter-university research projects.

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